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Governing Energy: Asia’s Future and the G20 
 
Asia’s future peace and prosperity depend on whether it can solve its energy challenges. The 
region’s striking economic growth in recent decades has been – literally – fueled by massive and 
reckless development of fossil fuel-based energy systems, in ways that are clearly unsustainable. 
The costs, in environmental devastation, damage to health, and geopolitical instability, are high 
and growing, and increasingly unnecessary as new technologies reach a transformative tipping 
point. But new technologies alone will not change the current grim realities. Such change 
requires overcoming enormous vested interests, deeply entrenched practices, and above all habits 
of thought and assumptions. And here, oddly enough, Asia may find help at the G20 – if the G20 
can be imaginative enough. 
Costs of the current energy system 
For many decades, both economic prosperity and national security have depended on access to 
fossil fuels. Energy security – defined in terms of reliable and affordable access to such fuels – 
has trumped concerns over the vast environmental, geopolitical, and social costs of the fossil-
based energy system. But now, the costs to Asia of its current extreme reliance on fossil fuel 
sources are increasingly apparent. The geopolitical tensions in maritime Asia, demonstrated 
anew in recent days in armed confrontations at sea between China and Vietnam, and China and 
the Philippines, are in significant part based on competition for the fossil fuel resources believed 
to lie under the seabed in contested territories, a competition seen as inevitable due to the 
widespread assumption that fossil fuel consumption must continue to soar to keep Asia’s 
economies aloft.  
The horrific pollution plaguing China and increasingly India comes largely from fossil fuel 
combustion. The inherent and strong connections between water security, food security, and 
energy systems, which are just starting to gain attention, ensure that all of the region’s key 
resource challenges depend ultimately on solving the energy dilemma. Conventional power 
plants require large quantities of withdrawals from rivers and streams, aquifers and lakes, and 
such water may not be available to support planned energy expansions in water-stressed Asia. 
And energy – or rather, lack of energy – is a key issue in tackling Asia’s remaining massive 
poverty and growing inequality. Poverty can be defined in significant part by lack of access to 
basic energy services: lighting, heating and cooling, cooking, transport. The global statistics are 
disturbing: 1.3 billion people lack any access to electricity (and it is no coincidence that this 
figure is roughly the same as the global cohort of the utterly destitute in income terms); 2.8 
billion must rely on traditional biomass fuels for cooking and heating; ¾ of the world’s 
population accounts for only 10 percent of global energy consumption. On current trends, these 
figures will barely improve by 2030. 
Unpredictability 
Despite the proliferation of confident projections about Asia’s future energy picture, it is almost 
impossible to know what Asia’s future energy sources or systems will be more than a few years 
out. Prediction is always hard, especially about the more distant future – and especially about 
energy. Energy guru Daniel Yergin has pointed out that as recently as 2010 the conventional 
wisdom on energy hailed the “nuclear renaissance” that would sweep the world as new nuclear 
technologies and growing climate pressures came to bear. Then came Fukushima. Just five years 
ago, the United States was becoming the world’s largest importer of liquefied natural gas and 
was said to face a dire future of growing energy imports and huge pressures to ramp up reliance 
on coal, despite its horrific climate consequences. Thanks to the fracking revolution for gas and 
oil, those same prognosticators now see the United States heading toward energy independence, 
the collapse of domestic coal consumption, and a vastly improved geopolitical situation.  
The uncertainties are compounded by the increasingly compelling case for major action on 
climate change, which has moved out of the “problem for the future” category with recent 
studies demonstrating strong current impacts. As those impacts grow, governments and 
businesses alike will find it ever harder to pretend that a fossil-dominated future can happen. 
Widespread scientific and global political consensus asserts that an increase of just 2 degrees 
centigrade over average pre-industrial temperatures poses unacceptable risks of catastrophe. As 
Bill McKibben has pointed out, limiting our rising planetary fever to that level requires humanity 
to limit its additional carbon emissions to no more than another 565 gigatons – which would 
mean leaving most of the 2750 gigatons of carbon in proven fossil fuel reserves in the ground, a 
compelling argument that is increasingly shaping investment and policy discourse. That 
constitutes a lot of “stranded assets,” owned by powerful vested interests that will fight hard 
against policies that would stop them from exploiting those assets to the full.  
At the same time, a variety of renewable energy and energy storage technologies are approaching 
or have reached market viability. It is entirely plausible to envision a scenario in which a 
combination of such technologies will become sufficiently competitive that the G20 a decade or 
so from now will be debating the emerging problem of massive stranded assets in fossils. 
The need for better energy governance  
But even the achievement of a technological tipping point in the next few years would not 
obviate the need for better national and global energy governance. Widespread acceptance in 
principle of the need to shift to low-carbon energy sources has not led to significant 
decarbonization in practice. Obviously, changing industrial civilization based on fossil fuels is 
not a quick and easy process. But many of the barriers to change reflect inertia and the 
incoherence of national and global energy policy structures and processes rather than inherent 
physical realities or lack of promising technological alternatives.  
At the national level, energy is poorly governed throughout the region, with multiple agencies 
more concerned with individual fuel sources – as in India’s five energy ministries – rather than a 
comprehensive and sustainable energy system. Domestic regulatory capacity on energy is weak 
and poorly informed about the linkages between energy and other issues. The siloes and lack of 
broad perspective make it virtually impossible for even well-intentioned energy governors to 
overcome the existing very strong vested interests in business as usual. And many are not 
necessarily focused on the public good – fossil fuels and related large-scale infrastructure have 
proven to be susceptible to substantial rent-seeking.  
The International Architecture 
The global energy governance architecture has limited capacity to help. It consists of an erratic 
array of actors: national and sometimes regional or local governments and their interactions; 
multinational firms, both private and state-owned; inter-governmental institutions such as the 
International Energy Agency, OPEC, the IAEA, the Energy Charter Treaty, and the IEF; the 
various summit processes (notably the G8 and G20); regional organizations like the ASEAN 
regional energy framework or UN ESCAP’s focus on regional infrastructure; multilateral 
development banks; export credit agencies; a growing array of partnerships and initiatives like 
the UN’s Sustainable Energy for All collaboration; and advocacy organizations interested in 
various energy and environment issues. All weigh in on various aspects of cross-border energy 
policy in a remarkable cacophony of cross-purposes.  
What is missing is a serious effort to integrate political economy into energy policy. Investment 
policy, trade policy, and intellectual property regimes, for example, do not systematically 
consider how rules in those arenas affect energy policy choices. And this is where the G20 could 
come in. 
Almost since it was reborn in 2008 as a leaders’–level summit process, the G20 has paid 
attention to energy. It made passing mention of energy security in the communique of the 2008 
Washington summit. The 2009 Pittsburgh summit featured an important agreement on phasing 
out subsidies for fossil fuels. The Korea 2010 meeting emphasized commitment to green growth, 
reiterated in Mexico in 2012, with some commitments on phasing out fossil subsidies and 
investing in clean energy. And in 2013, the St Petersburg summit saw the creation of the Energy 
Sustainability Working Group (ESWG). 
But to date, the G20 has separated its focus on energy (generally defined in fossil fuel terms) 
from its core work on the international economy. The ESWG during the 2014 Australian G20 
presidency has focused on energy efficiency, global energy architecture, market transparency 
and investment, and gas markets, while continuing the work on inefficient fossil fuel subsidies 
launched in the 2009 Pittsburgh summit. It has an enormous opportunity – as soon as the 
upcoming ESWG meeting in late May 2014 – to bridge energy expertise with the broader 
financial agenda. 
A key obstacle to making the transition to a sustainable energy future is that financing 
overwhelmingly still flows to fossil fuels rather than to alternative systems of energy services, 
thanks not only to short-term financial considerations but also to an array of regulations, 
subsidies, and entrenched relationships. The G20 could be an effective forum for creating an 
overarching vision of international energy governance that focuses on service delivery rather 
than fossil sources, bringing together energy expertise, finance, and leaders. The trillion dollars 
or so of investment needed to ensure sufficient global energy supply will not come about, and 
certainly will not support a transition to sustainable energy for all, just in response to short-term 
market signals. The norms and standards for energy investment are strongly influenced by 
governments via official export credit agencies and sovereign wealth funds. One part of the 
G20’s role is clearly to facilitate the functioning of financial markets, but it can also shape norms 
and standards about how that money is used.  
And the G20 is also well positioned to make good use of a strongly emerging trend in global 
governance: the growing efficacy of cross-sector collaborations that bring business and civil 
society to the governance table. Global governance has long since become the province of 
multiple “governors” – actors from the private sector and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) with capacity to shape and implement rules. And increasingly those governors are 
working together. Such collaborations range from specific public-private partnerships focused on 
big infrastructure projects to coalitions of businesses and NGOs working together to transform 
business practices in the public interest.  
The G20 leaders’ summit already has parallel B20 (business community) and C20 (civil society) 
processes in place to provide a framework for such partnerships. Revamping the global energy 
system clearly requires massive involvement of all sectors, and there are major parts of the 
business community with a strong interest in supporting the development of more rational energy 
systems. For example, the International Civil Aviation Organization is facilitating work by an 
expert group on mechanisms to enable carbon-neutral growth in the aviation industry starting in 
2020, a process that includes business and NGOs.  
Even the traditional energy industry may recognize its interest in using G20 processes to lobby 
for such key policy instruments as a reasonable and sustainable price on carbon. Many large oil 
firms already build an implicit carbon price into their plans, and would welcome regulatory 
certainty on what that price will actually be. 
One very surprising such collaboration provides an example of the impact such unlikely 
bedfellows can have in addressing problems that purely intergovernmental processes have failed 
to manage. It recently unfolded in Indonesia, where environmental campaigners like Greenpeace 
and WWF had created intense pressure on the palm oil pulp and paper industries to halt massive 
deforestation. Deforestation and other land use changes constitute some 20 percent of the 
contribution to climate change, with Indonesia one of the chief culprits. The widespread practice 
of clearing forest by burning it also regularly creates a choking haze that can cloak Singapore 
and other nearby nations in a Beijing-like shroud not of their own making. Many years of inter-
governmental dialogue failed to have much impact on the problem, but the environmental 
campaigners did – with a twist.  
After a highly effective campaign that persuaded most large companies not to purchase palm oil 
from Indonesia or products from Indonesia-based Asia Pulp and Paper, Greenpeace and other 
environmental NGOs entered into new partnerships with the palm oil suppliers and APP, 
working together to halt the country’s rapid deforestation and evaluating together how best to 
stop the burning of high carbon stock areas. Because this new collaborative approach took hold 
only in 2011 and producers are still being brought on board, it is too soon to know whether the 
process is a fully adequate response to the scale of the problem. But certainly progress has been 
made, which is more than can be said for the regional inter-governmental efforts.  
In short, energy currently constitutes one of Asia’s biggest challenges, and exacerbates most of 
the rest. From geopolitics to environment to inequality, existing energy systems and policies are 
both essential to the functioning of Asia’s economies and are storing up massive problems for 
the future. The inadequacies of incoherent energy governance are looming ever larger over 
Asia’s future. To fix energy requires juggling multiple factors: geopolitical stability, the security 
of energy infrastructure, massive environmental externalities, investment policies, trade rules, 
and water and agriculture policy, among others. But with leadership and imagination, the energy 
picture can change drastically. The G20, for all its shortcomings, is better placed than most to 
think broadly, and especially to connect the complexities of energy with those of finance, 
investment, and trade. The leaders’ process, in collaboration with business and civil society 
groups, may be the best hope for consolidating market-based economic rationality for energy 
markets with rules that effectively internalize the sector’s negative externalities and promote 
massive investment in the energy transition that is so badly needed. 
 
